성남대형로펌 김민석 방미, 정청래 당원 특강…차기 당권 놓고 ‘잰걸음’
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성남대형로펌 41년 만에 이례적 총리 단독 방문미 정부 고위인사·부통령 회담 조율정, 지방 이어 1인1표제 의견 청취
이재명 대통령의 신년 기자회견이 열린 21일 정청래 더불어민주당 대표는 당원 대상 특별강연에 나섰다. 김민석 국무총리는 22일 출국하는 방미 일정을 공개했다. 정치권 일각에선 오는 8월 당대표 선거를 앞두고 차기 당권 주자들이 연초부터 잰걸음을 하고 있다는 해석이 나온다.
정 대표는 이날 국회 의원회관 대회의실에서 당원들을 대상으로 ‘이재명 정부와 민주당의 미래 비전’을 주제로 특별강연을 했다. 정 대표는 이달 9일에는 부산 벡스코, 17일에는 대구 엑스코에서 지역 당원들을 대상으로 특별강연을 했다.
정 대표가 재추진하고 있는 1인1표제와 관련해 특별강연에서 당원들의 의견을 청취하려는 것으로도 풀이된다. 1인1표제는 당대표 선출 시 권리당원과 대의원 표 가치를 동일하게 조정하는 것으로, 당원 지지를 강점으로 하는 정 대표의 연임을 위한 포석이라는 평가를 받아왔다.
김 총리도 22일부터 26일까지 2박5일간 미국 워싱턴과 뉴욕을 방문하는 일정을 공개했다. 총리실은 이날 “김 총리는 방미 기간 중 미 정부 고위인사 면담, 연방하원의원 간담회, 동포간담회 등을 할 예정”이라고 보도자료를 통해 밝혔다. 김 총리는 방미 기간 J D 밴스 미국 부통령과 회담하는 일정도 조율 중인 것으로 알려졌다.
일반적으로 국무총리의 해외 방문은 대통령 정상 외교가 미처 소화하지 못하는 부분을 보완하는 성격으로 이뤄지는 만큼 이번 방미는 이례적으로 받아들여진다. 총리실에 따르면 국무총리가 미 행정부와 한·미 간 현안을 논의하기 위해 단독으로 방미하는 것은 1985년 노신영 전 총리가 방미한 후 41년 만이고 1987년 민주화 이후 처음이다. 이번 일정은 김 총리 취임 이후 첫 해외 일정이기도 하다.
지난해 12월부터 김 총리는 전국을 순회하며 국정 설명회를 열며 광폭 행보를 하고 있다. 지난달 4일 광주를 시작으로 7일 인천, 15일 서울, 19일 전남 무안, 이달 7일 경남 사천, 15일 강원, 16일 경기 수원, 19일 전북 등을 찾았다.
The past year, since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House, has been a relentless succession of the unpredictable. He weaponized tariffs, turning them against allies as readily as adversaries. He invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to Alaska and greeted him like an old friend, and—defying his reputation as an “isolationist”—ordered airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Trump has given no one time to even take stock of his first year back in office. At the very start of the new year, he has launched an attack on Venezuela and is openly stoking ambitions to seize Greenland by force if necessary.
Asked to choose words that best describe the Trump administration’s foreign policy over the past year, Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, responded in an email interview with the Kyunghyang Daily News on January 19: “Thuggish. Extortionate. Frenzied. Myopic.” Wertheim is also a co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy, which Foreign Affairs selected as its “Book of the Year”.
Wertheim said that President Trump is “offering an enthusiastically naked imperialism,” adding that “even U.S. allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying.”
KYUNGHYANG: The operation to capture Nicolas Maduro came as a shock in that it appeared to mark a return to an era in which “might makes right.” What do you believe the Trump administration’s attack on Venezuela signifies for the international order?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s attack on Venezuela is hardly the first time the United States has used military force aggressively and in violation of international law. What is different is that Trump makes little-to-no attempt even to claim he’s acting for a higher principle. He says his main motive for turning gunboats on Caracas is to “take the oil.” I believe him. He is currently threatening to strike multiple countries and annex the sovereign territory of other states, including NATO allies. He may well do that.
When they went to war, Trump’s predecessors not only claimed to be improving the international order; they also believed what they said — perhaps to a fault. But if traditional U.S. presidents sometimes allowed liberal ordering to turn into liberal imperialism, Trump is offering enthusiastically naked imperialism.
For the world, Trump’s conduct means that power politics has become an inescapable reality. Weak countries can count on Trump to boss them around. Even American allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying. The effect on U.S. adversaries, namely China and Russia, remains to be seen; they don’t need America’s permission to act as they like. At a minimum, however, Trump has helped Beijing to present itself as the responsible steward of international order and more easily justify its own coercion, present and future. He has further lowered the bar Moscow needs to clear to appear less bad, in the eyes of many across the Global South, than the United States and the West.
KYUNGHYANG: President Trump has also suggested the possibility of using military force against Greenland. Following the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities and the apparent success of the Venezuela operation, some argue that Trump may have developed a sense of confidence — or even efficacy — in the use of military force. How far do you think he may be willing to expand the use of force going forward?
WERTHEIM: Trump is emboldened. He has ordered a succession of attacks that might have caused immediate blowback but didn’t — so far. The trend began with his assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in the last year of his first term. Now, in his second term, he has bombed Iran, blown up alleged drug boats in the Caribbean basin, and launched airstrikes in Syria and Nigeria, all before the raid to capture Maduro. Trump still prefers to take one-and-done military actions and avoid the commitment of ground forces. But he probably thinks that the doubters kept warning of risks, and each time he proved them wrong, avoiding the quagmires that bedeviled other presidents. I fear that his luck will run out, and he may order more and more ambitious operations.
KYUNGHYANG: Trump’s announcement of plans to impose tariffs on eight European Union countries that oppose the U.S. annexation of Greenland has pushed the transatlantic alliance into what many see as its gravest crisis to date. What do you believe the future holds for the transatlantic alliance and NATO?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s quest to annex Greenland has the potential not only to fracture the transatlantic alliance but to divide Europe as well. If Trump keeps intensifying pressure on Denmark to sell the territory, the European countries who rely the most on U.S. military protection may urge Copenhagen to appease Trump, while other European countries may find that prospect unconscionable. So Europe could effectively split into two camps, with the United States siding with one against the other.
However the Greenland affair turns out, NATO will never be the same. Major European countries, including France and Germany, have learned they cannot remain dependent on the United States — not under Trump and not after Trump. Not only is American power unreliable, but it is liable to turn into a dagger aimed at your heart. I can imagine several possible futures for the transatlantic alliance, but the next decade won’t look like the last.
KYUNGHYANG: For years, Latin America was treated as a low-priority region in major U.S. strategic documents. Yet in the Trump administration’s latest National Security Strategy, the Western Hemisphere is designated as a top strategic priority. Why do you think the Trump administration, unlike previous administrations, is placing such emphasis on the Western Hemisphere?
WERTHEIM: Consider three levels: Trump, his administration, and the world.
Trump has all along felt that the most grievous threats to the United States traverse the nation’s borders. Immigrants, gangs, drugs, and even, less directly, trade — Trump securitizes these issues and prioritizes them above conventional military threats far away. That worldview has put Trump on a collision course with America’s hemispheric neighbors.
Yet it’s only in his second presidency that the Western Hemisphere has ascended to the top of U.S. strategic priorities. That’s because Trump has finally surrounded himself with likeminded or obedient advisers willing to implement his vision. In part because his vision is capacious, his administration contains several factions who compete over most areas of foreign policy. On the Western Hemisphere, however, the factions overlap. “Primacists” such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio can agree with “restrainers,” who favor U.S. military pullbacks overseas, that the United States should show greater concern with challenges close to home.
And now that the United States has lost a position of dominance in Europe and Asia, the Western Hemisphere has reemerged as a fresh-seeming terrain in which to wield American power. Trump prefers to deal with the weak, and Trump isn’t alone: the United States has sought to achieve uncontested global supremacy ever since the Cold War ended. Today Washington can no longer enjoy the same position worldwide, but it can dominate what the Trump administration calls “our hemisphere.”
KYUNGHYANG: Trump and the MAGA movement have long been described as isolationist. Yet Trump has intervened extensively abroad, calling into question whether that label remains analytically useful. He once appeared to approach the use of power like a businessman weighing costs and returns, but he now seems increasingly willing to assert power for its own sake. How would you characterize the underlying logic or strategy of Trump’s foreign policy?
WERTHEIM: Trump has never been an isolationist; he wants to take things from the world, not withdraw from it. Nor does Trump make careful calculations of costs and benefits. He has always been a showman more than a businessman, and as president, he is guided above all by the performance of power. He wants to tell Americans, the world, and perhaps himself that he is in control and getting his way. More specifically, he is performing his vision of “peace through strength,” which involves both ending armed conflicts and using military force in targeted ways to display American might.
The irony is that Trump is supposed to put “America first” in all things, yet he lacks a coherent account of what American interests are. At least the original so-called isolationists of 1940 and 1941 had an identifiable understanding of U.S. interests: they contended that so long as the United States kept outside powers out of the Western Hemisphere, North America would remain secure from attack. They were not necessarily wrong on that point, even though their prescription might have been terrible for the world. Trump, by contrast, chafes at the global commitments he has inherited but has yet to relinquish any of them.
KYUNGHYANG: The new National Security Strategy(NSS) does not contain systemic criticism of China or Russia. Some analysts note that this is the first NSS since 1988 that does not reference China’s authoritarianism even once. What do you think this shift signifies?
WERTHEIM: The National Security Strategy makes almost no distinction between democratic and authoritarian states. Under Trump’s predecessors, however, the United States has opposed Russia and China not only because they were authoritarian, but also, and mainly, because they threaten American primacy, including U.S. allies.
The new National Security Strategy does not take the accommodating view of China that some analysts have suggested. True, it avoids adversarial verbiage toward China. Yet it offers Beijing no concessions — nothing but the chance to accept coexistence on Washington’s terms. In particular, the document states that Taiwan is strategically and economically important to the United States and promises to “build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.” While it seems Trump wants to avoid needlessly antagonizing Beijing through rhetoric, U.S.-China competition is continuing.
KYUNGHYANG: But some experts argue that the era of hegemonic competition is coming to an end, and that the United States, China, and Russia may be moving toward a great-power arrangement that tacitly recognizes spheres of influence. Do you agree with this interpretation?
WERTHEIM: I essentially disagree. Trump has reclaimed America’s traditional sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, but that does not mean he’s willing to grant China or Russia spheres in their own regions. The normal hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy is: “spheres of influence for me, but not for thee.” If that hypocrisy hasn’t bothered other presidents, it certainly won’t bother Trump.
Trump has not offered to cede a sphere of influence to Beijing or Moscow in their regions. He hardly welcomed the expansion of Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific. Trump has, of course, supported Russia’s demand to retain the territory it currently occupies in Ukraine, plus the rest of the Donetsk region, but in that case Trump seems to be attempting to reach a pragmatic end to the war rather than grant Russia a wider sphere of influence in eastern Europe or Central Asia.
In short, Trump is asserting American power globally, not pulling the United States back to its own hemisphere. That said, Trump may yet make some sort of deal over Taiwan or diminish U.S. defense responsibilities in Europe. He may also weaken the foundations that generate American power over the long term, including the country’s international attractiveness and state capacity. In a decades’ time, the United States may well have a more modest global military presence and fewer defense commitments. But even if that happens, the United States will remain a major security player in Asia and the Western Hemisphere at a minimum, and I doubt that Russia could rampage through much of eastern Europe.
KYUNGHYANG: North Korea is not mentioned even once in the new NSS. This has led to speculation in South Korea that the United States may have effectively accepted the practical impossibility of North Korean denuclearization and downgraded the priority of the nuclear issue. What is your assessment?
WERTHEIM: As Barack Obama left office a decade ago, he told Trump that North Korea was the most pressing threat the new president would face. Since Trump failed to make a nuclear deal with Kim Jong-un in 2019, North Korea has dropped far down Washington’s list of foreign policy priorities. The new National Security Strategy reflects that reality.
In my view, the United States has all but accepted the practical impossibility of fully denuclearizing North Korea, even though it hasn’t officially said so. There is no realistic scenario in which North Korea will decide to relinquish its nuclear arsenal.
The Biden administration effectively sought to strengthen deterrence and manage risk, not to advance toward denuclearization. Trump personally seems to want to return to the negotiating table with Kim Jong-un as part of his attempt to be the “president of peace.” But there are no signs of what Trump would be willing to offer Kim, and Kim’s asking price, if there is one, has gone up due to his partnership with Russia and distrust of the United States.
KYUNGHYANG: The new NSS emphasizes that the United States will no longer bear security burdens unilaterally, calling on allies to share responsibility. It specifically highlights the roles of South Korea and Japan in the Indo-Pacific, including the defense of the First Island Chain. In the event of a contingency involving Taiwan, what strategic role does the United States expect South Korea to play?
WERTHEIM: I don’t think many people in the U.S. government expect South Korea to join a U.S.-led coalition to fight China. (Nor is it knowable whether the United States would fight China; “strategic ambiguity” isn’t just a policy but a real reflection of U.S. intention, or lack thereof.) Instead, South Korea would be expected to provide logistical support for allied forces and produce defense equipment to sustain the war effort. Most importantly, South Korea would need to assume the full burden of deterring North Korea even as some U.S. forces and assets on the Korean peninsula get diverted to the Taiwan theater.
KYUNGHYANG: I would like to ask about the Trump administration’s response to the recent tensions between China and Japan. While Prime Minister Takaichi’s comments about possible involvement in a Taiwan contingency may have been diplomatically awkward, they were broadly aligned with U.S. expectations regarding Japan’s security role. However, the Trump administration’s expressions of support for Japan were both muted in tone and notably delayed, giving the impression that Washington preferred to stand on the sidelines of this dispute.
WERTHEIM: The U.S. ambassador to Japan did express support for Japan and Takaichi, but Trump himself was muted. Trump’s response reflects his desire for stable relations with Beijing after the two countries had reached a fragile trade truce. In addition, Trump prefers to remain strictly ambiguous about how the United States itself would respond to a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. In the context of Taiwan as well as Ukraine, he seems to think it’s unwise for a weaker country to use inflammatory language that could provoke a stronger country. So it wouldn’t surprise me if Trump personally disapproved of Takaichi’s comments, which appeared to suggest that Japan would use military force if China used armed force to attack Taiwan.
Still, I don’t see a real change in U.S. policy so far. We’ll find out in the coming months if Trump and Xi are interested in reaching a new understanding about Taiwan.
충남도가 수도권 생활폐기물 유입 차단을 위한 고강도 대응에 나선 상황 속에서 법규를 위반한 재활용업체 2곳이 추가로 적발됐다.
도는 수도권 생활쓰레기 처리 용역 계약을 체결한 천안·아산 지역 재활용업체를 대상으로 점검을 실시한 결과 위반 사항을 확인했으며 사법·행정 조치를 병행 추진할 예정이라고 20일 밝혔다.
도는 올해부터 수도권 생활폐기물 직매립이 금지되면서 도내로 수도권 쓰레기가 유입되고 있는 정황을 파악하고 시·군과 합동 점검반을 꾸려 지난 6일 공주·서산에 이어 19일 천안·아산 업체에 대한 점검을 실시했다.
점검 결과, 천안에 위치한 한 업체는 지난 2~17일 경기도 남양주시의 생활폐기물과 대형 폐기물을 반입한 사실이 확인됐다. 이 업체는 생활폐기물 수집·운반업 허가 없이 폐기물을 들여와 폐기물관리법을 위반한 것으로 도는 판단하고 있다.
위반 사실이 최종 확정될 경우 해당 업체는 5년 이하 징역 또는 5000만원 이하 벌금에 처해질 수 있다.
아산의 한 재활용업체는 서울시 도봉구와 폐합성수지류 등에 대한 위탁 처리 계약을 체결했으나, 현재까지 생활폐기물을 반입·처리한 사실은 없는 것으로 확인됐다. 다만 사업장 내 폐기물 보관시설이 파손된 상태로 방치돼 있어 폐기물관리법 위반에 해당한다고 도는 설명했다.
도는 천안시와 아산시를 통해 두 업체에 대한 사법·행정 조치를 동시에 추진하도록 했다.
도중원 도 환경관리과장은 “수도권 지자체가 재활용업체와 생활폐기물 처리 용역 계약을 맺는 사례가 늘어나면서 반입 경로도 점점 다양해지고 있다”며 “수도권 폐기물 반입 시도를 원천 차단하기 위해 고강도 대응을 지속적으로 펼치겠다”고 말했다.
앞서 지난 6일 적발된 공주·서산 재활용업체 2곳은 서울 금천구와의 생활폐기물 위탁 처리 계약을 파기하고 현재는 수도권 쓰레기를 반입하지 않고 있는 것으로 확인됐다. 이들 업체에 대해서는 최근 1개월 영업정지 처분이 사전 예고됐다.
도는 앞으로도 수도권 지자체와 계약을 체결했거나 계약을 추진 중인 도내 민간 소각장과 종합재활용업체를 대상으로 모니터링을 지속적으로 실시하고 수도권 폐기물 반입이 확인될 경우 즉시 현장 점검에 나설 계획이다.
아울러 환경단체 등과 수도권 쓰레기 문제를 공유하고 생활폐기물 발생지 처리 원칙과 관련한 쟁점 사항에 대해서는 충청권 시·도 및 관계 기관과 공동 대응 방안을 모색할 방침이다.
이재명 대통령의 신년 기자회견이 열린 21일 정청래 더불어민주당 대표는 당원 대상 특별강연에 나섰다. 김민석 국무총리는 22일 출국하는 방미 일정을 공개했다. 정치권 일각에선 오는 8월 당대표 선거를 앞두고 차기 당권 주자들이 연초부터 잰걸음을 하고 있다는 해석이 나온다.
정 대표는 이날 국회 의원회관 대회의실에서 당원들을 대상으로 ‘이재명 정부와 민주당의 미래 비전’을 주제로 특별강연을 했다. 정 대표는 이달 9일에는 부산 벡스코, 17일에는 대구 엑스코에서 지역 당원들을 대상으로 특별강연을 했다.
정 대표가 재추진하고 있는 1인1표제와 관련해 특별강연에서 당원들의 의견을 청취하려는 것으로도 풀이된다. 1인1표제는 당대표 선출 시 권리당원과 대의원 표 가치를 동일하게 조정하는 것으로, 당원 지지를 강점으로 하는 정 대표의 연임을 위한 포석이라는 평가를 받아왔다.
김 총리도 22일부터 26일까지 2박5일간 미국 워싱턴과 뉴욕을 방문하는 일정을 공개했다. 총리실은 이날 “김 총리는 방미 기간 중 미 정부 고위인사 면담, 연방하원의원 간담회, 동포간담회 등을 할 예정”이라고 보도자료를 통해 밝혔다. 김 총리는 방미 기간 J D 밴스 미국 부통령과 회담하는 일정도 조율 중인 것으로 알려졌다.
일반적으로 국무총리의 해외 방문은 대통령 정상 외교가 미처 소화하지 못하는 부분을 보완하는 성격으로 이뤄지는 만큼 이번 방미는 이례적으로 받아들여진다. 총리실에 따르면 국무총리가 미 행정부와 한·미 간 현안을 논의하기 위해 단독으로 방미하는 것은 1985년 노신영 전 총리가 방미한 후 41년 만이고 1987년 민주화 이후 처음이다. 이번 일정은 김 총리 취임 이후 첫 해외 일정이기도 하다.
지난해 12월부터 김 총리는 전국을 순회하며 국정 설명회를 열며 광폭 행보를 하고 있다. 지난달 4일 광주를 시작으로 7일 인천, 15일 서울, 19일 전남 무안, 이달 7일 경남 사천, 15일 강원, 16일 경기 수원, 19일 전북 등을 찾았다.
The past year, since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House, has been a relentless succession of the unpredictable. He weaponized tariffs, turning them against allies as readily as adversaries. He invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to Alaska and greeted him like an old friend, and—defying his reputation as an “isolationist”—ordered airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Trump has given no one time to even take stock of his first year back in office. At the very start of the new year, he has launched an attack on Venezuela and is openly stoking ambitions to seize Greenland by force if necessary.
Asked to choose words that best describe the Trump administration’s foreign policy over the past year, Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, responded in an email interview with the Kyunghyang Daily News on January 19: “Thuggish. Extortionate. Frenzied. Myopic.” Wertheim is also a co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy, which Foreign Affairs selected as its “Book of the Year”.
Wertheim said that President Trump is “offering an enthusiastically naked imperialism,” adding that “even U.S. allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying.”
KYUNGHYANG: The operation to capture Nicolas Maduro came as a shock in that it appeared to mark a return to an era in which “might makes right.” What do you believe the Trump administration’s attack on Venezuela signifies for the international order?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s attack on Venezuela is hardly the first time the United States has used military force aggressively and in violation of international law. What is different is that Trump makes little-to-no attempt even to claim he’s acting for a higher principle. He says his main motive for turning gunboats on Caracas is to “take the oil.” I believe him. He is currently threatening to strike multiple countries and annex the sovereign territory of other states, including NATO allies. He may well do that.
When they went to war, Trump’s predecessors not only claimed to be improving the international order; they also believed what they said — perhaps to a fault. But if traditional U.S. presidents sometimes allowed liberal ordering to turn into liberal imperialism, Trump is offering enthusiastically naked imperialism.
For the world, Trump’s conduct means that power politics has become an inescapable reality. Weak countries can count on Trump to boss them around. Even American allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying. The effect on U.S. adversaries, namely China and Russia, remains to be seen; they don’t need America’s permission to act as they like. At a minimum, however, Trump has helped Beijing to present itself as the responsible steward of international order and more easily justify its own coercion, present and future. He has further lowered the bar Moscow needs to clear to appear less bad, in the eyes of many across the Global South, than the United States and the West.
KYUNGHYANG: President Trump has also suggested the possibility of using military force against Greenland. Following the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities and the apparent success of the Venezuela operation, some argue that Trump may have developed a sense of confidence — or even efficacy — in the use of military force. How far do you think he may be willing to expand the use of force going forward?
WERTHEIM: Trump is emboldened. He has ordered a succession of attacks that might have caused immediate blowback but didn’t — so far. The trend began with his assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in the last year of his first term. Now, in his second term, he has bombed Iran, blown up alleged drug boats in the Caribbean basin, and launched airstrikes in Syria and Nigeria, all before the raid to capture Maduro. Trump still prefers to take one-and-done military actions and avoid the commitment of ground forces. But he probably thinks that the doubters kept warning of risks, and each time he proved them wrong, avoiding the quagmires that bedeviled other presidents. I fear that his luck will run out, and he may order more and more ambitious operations.
KYUNGHYANG: Trump’s announcement of plans to impose tariffs on eight European Union countries that oppose the U.S. annexation of Greenland has pushed the transatlantic alliance into what many see as its gravest crisis to date. What do you believe the future holds for the transatlantic alliance and NATO?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s quest to annex Greenland has the potential not only to fracture the transatlantic alliance but to divide Europe as well. If Trump keeps intensifying pressure on Denmark to sell the territory, the European countries who rely the most on U.S. military protection may urge Copenhagen to appease Trump, while other European countries may find that prospect unconscionable. So Europe could effectively split into two camps, with the United States siding with one against the other.
However the Greenland affair turns out, NATO will never be the same. Major European countries, including France and Germany, have learned they cannot remain dependent on the United States — not under Trump and not after Trump. Not only is American power unreliable, but it is liable to turn into a dagger aimed at your heart. I can imagine several possible futures for the transatlantic alliance, but the next decade won’t look like the last.
KYUNGHYANG: For years, Latin America was treated as a low-priority region in major U.S. strategic documents. Yet in the Trump administration’s latest National Security Strategy, the Western Hemisphere is designated as a top strategic priority. Why do you think the Trump administration, unlike previous administrations, is placing such emphasis on the Western Hemisphere?
WERTHEIM: Consider three levels: Trump, his administration, and the world.
Trump has all along felt that the most grievous threats to the United States traverse the nation’s borders. Immigrants, gangs, drugs, and even, less directly, trade — Trump securitizes these issues and prioritizes them above conventional military threats far away. That worldview has put Trump on a collision course with America’s hemispheric neighbors.
Yet it’s only in his second presidency that the Western Hemisphere has ascended to the top of U.S. strategic priorities. That’s because Trump has finally surrounded himself with likeminded or obedient advisers willing to implement his vision. In part because his vision is capacious, his administration contains several factions who compete over most areas of foreign policy. On the Western Hemisphere, however, the factions overlap. “Primacists” such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio can agree with “restrainers,” who favor U.S. military pullbacks overseas, that the United States should show greater concern with challenges close to home.
And now that the United States has lost a position of dominance in Europe and Asia, the Western Hemisphere has reemerged as a fresh-seeming terrain in which to wield American power. Trump prefers to deal with the weak, and Trump isn’t alone: the United States has sought to achieve uncontested global supremacy ever since the Cold War ended. Today Washington can no longer enjoy the same position worldwide, but it can dominate what the Trump administration calls “our hemisphere.”
KYUNGHYANG: Trump and the MAGA movement have long been described as isolationist. Yet Trump has intervened extensively abroad, calling into question whether that label remains analytically useful. He once appeared to approach the use of power like a businessman weighing costs and returns, but he now seems increasingly willing to assert power for its own sake. How would you characterize the underlying logic or strategy of Trump’s foreign policy?
WERTHEIM: Trump has never been an isolationist; he wants to take things from the world, not withdraw from it. Nor does Trump make careful calculations of costs and benefits. He has always been a showman more than a businessman, and as president, he is guided above all by the performance of power. He wants to tell Americans, the world, and perhaps himself that he is in control and getting his way. More specifically, he is performing his vision of “peace through strength,” which involves both ending armed conflicts and using military force in targeted ways to display American might.
The irony is that Trump is supposed to put “America first” in all things, yet he lacks a coherent account of what American interests are. At least the original so-called isolationists of 1940 and 1941 had an identifiable understanding of U.S. interests: they contended that so long as the United States kept outside powers out of the Western Hemisphere, North America would remain secure from attack. They were not necessarily wrong on that point, even though their prescription might have been terrible for the world. Trump, by contrast, chafes at the global commitments he has inherited but has yet to relinquish any of them.
KYUNGHYANG: The new National Security Strategy(NSS) does not contain systemic criticism of China or Russia. Some analysts note that this is the first NSS since 1988 that does not reference China’s authoritarianism even once. What do you think this shift signifies?
WERTHEIM: The National Security Strategy makes almost no distinction between democratic and authoritarian states. Under Trump’s predecessors, however, the United States has opposed Russia and China not only because they were authoritarian, but also, and mainly, because they threaten American primacy, including U.S. allies.
The new National Security Strategy does not take the accommodating view of China that some analysts have suggested. True, it avoids adversarial verbiage toward China. Yet it offers Beijing no concessions — nothing but the chance to accept coexistence on Washington’s terms. In particular, the document states that Taiwan is strategically and economically important to the United States and promises to “build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.” While it seems Trump wants to avoid needlessly antagonizing Beijing through rhetoric, U.S.-China competition is continuing.
KYUNGHYANG: But some experts argue that the era of hegemonic competition is coming to an end, and that the United States, China, and Russia may be moving toward a great-power arrangement that tacitly recognizes spheres of influence. Do you agree with this interpretation?
WERTHEIM: I essentially disagree. Trump has reclaimed America’s traditional sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, but that does not mean he’s willing to grant China or Russia spheres in their own regions. The normal hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy is: “spheres of influence for me, but not for thee.” If that hypocrisy hasn’t bothered other presidents, it certainly won’t bother Trump.
Trump has not offered to cede a sphere of influence to Beijing or Moscow in their regions. He hardly welcomed the expansion of Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific. Trump has, of course, supported Russia’s demand to retain the territory it currently occupies in Ukraine, plus the rest of the Donetsk region, but in that case Trump seems to be attempting to reach a pragmatic end to the war rather than grant Russia a wider sphere of influence in eastern Europe or Central Asia.
In short, Trump is asserting American power globally, not pulling the United States back to its own hemisphere. That said, Trump may yet make some sort of deal over Taiwan or diminish U.S. defense responsibilities in Europe. He may also weaken the foundations that generate American power over the long term, including the country’s international attractiveness and state capacity. In a decades’ time, the United States may well have a more modest global military presence and fewer defense commitments. But even if that happens, the United States will remain a major security player in Asia and the Western Hemisphere at a minimum, and I doubt that Russia could rampage through much of eastern Europe.
KYUNGHYANG: North Korea is not mentioned even once in the new NSS. This has led to speculation in South Korea that the United States may have effectively accepted the practical impossibility of North Korean denuclearization and downgraded the priority of the nuclear issue. What is your assessment?
WERTHEIM: As Barack Obama left office a decade ago, he told Trump that North Korea was the most pressing threat the new president would face. Since Trump failed to make a nuclear deal with Kim Jong-un in 2019, North Korea has dropped far down Washington’s list of foreign policy priorities. The new National Security Strategy reflects that reality.
In my view, the United States has all but accepted the practical impossibility of fully denuclearizing North Korea, even though it hasn’t officially said so. There is no realistic scenario in which North Korea will decide to relinquish its nuclear arsenal.
The Biden administration effectively sought to strengthen deterrence and manage risk, not to advance toward denuclearization. Trump personally seems to want to return to the negotiating table with Kim Jong-un as part of his attempt to be the “president of peace.” But there are no signs of what Trump would be willing to offer Kim, and Kim’s asking price, if there is one, has gone up due to his partnership with Russia and distrust of the United States.
KYUNGHYANG: The new NSS emphasizes that the United States will no longer bear security burdens unilaterally, calling on allies to share responsibility. It specifically highlights the roles of South Korea and Japan in the Indo-Pacific, including the defense of the First Island Chain. In the event of a contingency involving Taiwan, what strategic role does the United States expect South Korea to play?
WERTHEIM: I don’t think many people in the U.S. government expect South Korea to join a U.S.-led coalition to fight China. (Nor is it knowable whether the United States would fight China; “strategic ambiguity” isn’t just a policy but a real reflection of U.S. intention, or lack thereof.) Instead, South Korea would be expected to provide logistical support for allied forces and produce defense equipment to sustain the war effort. Most importantly, South Korea would need to assume the full burden of deterring North Korea even as some U.S. forces and assets on the Korean peninsula get diverted to the Taiwan theater.
KYUNGHYANG: I would like to ask about the Trump administration’s response to the recent tensions between China and Japan. While Prime Minister Takaichi’s comments about possible involvement in a Taiwan contingency may have been diplomatically awkward, they were broadly aligned with U.S. expectations regarding Japan’s security role. However, the Trump administration’s expressions of support for Japan were both muted in tone and notably delayed, giving the impression that Washington preferred to stand on the sidelines of this dispute.
WERTHEIM: The U.S. ambassador to Japan did express support for Japan and Takaichi, but Trump himself was muted. Trump’s response reflects his desire for stable relations with Beijing after the two countries had reached a fragile trade truce. In addition, Trump prefers to remain strictly ambiguous about how the United States itself would respond to a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. In the context of Taiwan as well as Ukraine, he seems to think it’s unwise for a weaker country to use inflammatory language that could provoke a stronger country. So it wouldn’t surprise me if Trump personally disapproved of Takaichi’s comments, which appeared to suggest that Japan would use military force if China used armed force to attack Taiwan.
Still, I don’t see a real change in U.S. policy so far. We’ll find out in the coming months if Trump and Xi are interested in reaching a new understanding about Taiwan.
충남도가 수도권 생활폐기물 유입 차단을 위한 고강도 대응에 나선 상황 속에서 법규를 위반한 재활용업체 2곳이 추가로 적발됐다.
도는 수도권 생활쓰레기 처리 용역 계약을 체결한 천안·아산 지역 재활용업체를 대상으로 점검을 실시한 결과 위반 사항을 확인했으며 사법·행정 조치를 병행 추진할 예정이라고 20일 밝혔다.
도는 올해부터 수도권 생활폐기물 직매립이 금지되면서 도내로 수도권 쓰레기가 유입되고 있는 정황을 파악하고 시·군과 합동 점검반을 꾸려 지난 6일 공주·서산에 이어 19일 천안·아산 업체에 대한 점검을 실시했다.
점검 결과, 천안에 위치한 한 업체는 지난 2~17일 경기도 남양주시의 생활폐기물과 대형 폐기물을 반입한 사실이 확인됐다. 이 업체는 생활폐기물 수집·운반업 허가 없이 폐기물을 들여와 폐기물관리법을 위반한 것으로 도는 판단하고 있다.
위반 사실이 최종 확정될 경우 해당 업체는 5년 이하 징역 또는 5000만원 이하 벌금에 처해질 수 있다.
아산의 한 재활용업체는 서울시 도봉구와 폐합성수지류 등에 대한 위탁 처리 계약을 체결했으나, 현재까지 생활폐기물을 반입·처리한 사실은 없는 것으로 확인됐다. 다만 사업장 내 폐기물 보관시설이 파손된 상태로 방치돼 있어 폐기물관리법 위반에 해당한다고 도는 설명했다.
도는 천안시와 아산시를 통해 두 업체에 대한 사법·행정 조치를 동시에 추진하도록 했다.
도중원 도 환경관리과장은 “수도권 지자체가 재활용업체와 생활폐기물 처리 용역 계약을 맺는 사례가 늘어나면서 반입 경로도 점점 다양해지고 있다”며 “수도권 폐기물 반입 시도를 원천 차단하기 위해 고강도 대응을 지속적으로 펼치겠다”고 말했다.
앞서 지난 6일 적발된 공주·서산 재활용업체 2곳은 서울 금천구와의 생활폐기물 위탁 처리 계약을 파기하고 현재는 수도권 쓰레기를 반입하지 않고 있는 것으로 확인됐다. 이들 업체에 대해서는 최근 1개월 영업정지 처분이 사전 예고됐다.
도는 앞으로도 수도권 지자체와 계약을 체결했거나 계약을 추진 중인 도내 민간 소각장과 종합재활용업체를 대상으로 모니터링을 지속적으로 실시하고 수도권 폐기물 반입이 확인될 경우 즉시 현장 점검에 나설 계획이다.
아울러 환경단체 등과 수도권 쓰레기 문제를 공유하고 생활폐기물 발생지 처리 원칙과 관련한 쟁점 사항에 대해서는 충청권 시·도 및 관계 기관과 공동 대응 방안을 모색할 방침이다.
개인회생장기렌트
서울폰테크
수원성추행변호사
이지렌터카
수원법무법인
용인성범죄전문변호사
울산이혼전문변호사
평택학교폭력변호사
무심사장기렌트
안양대형로펌
인스타 좋아요 늘리기
평택학교폭력변호사
의정부변호사
의정부성범죄변호사
의정부변호사
부산이혼전문변호사
대전폰테크
인터넷가입현금지원
기업판촉물
수원형사변호사
서울이혼전문변호사
평택학교폭력변호사
수원학교폭력변호사
서울흥신소
의정부학교폭력변호사
빠른이혼
용인상간소송변호사
수원이혼변호사
수원학교폭력변호사
용인강간변호사
용인대형로펌
수원강간변호사
이지렌터카
이혼상담
의정부음주운전변호사
수원음주운전변호사
의정부대형로펌
폰테크
상간남소송
폰테크 당일
수원상간소송변호사
고양이혼전문변호사
의정부학교폭력변호사
이혼전문변호사
폰테크
수원이혼전문변호사
인터넷가입현금지원
수원법률사무소
분당불법촬영변호사
인스타그램 좋아요 구매
용인이혼변호사
문해력훈련
조정이혼
저신용무보증장기렌트카
한게임머니상
용인이혼변호사
용인성범죄전문변호사
의정부학교폭력변호사
수원상간소송변호사
의정부이혼변호사
무심사장기렌트
부장검사출신변호사
안양학교폭력변호사
양주학교폭력변호사
문해력
폰테크 카페
수원형사전문변호사
이혼전문변호사
수원학교폭력변호사
협의이혼
수원형사변호사
성남성범죄변호사
성남대형로펌
수원이혼변호사
이혼변호사
성남학교폭력변호사
수원상간소송변호사
인터넷가입
저신용장기렌트카
안양상간소송변호사
안양학교폭력변호사
성남상간소송변호사
이지렌트
탐정사무소
인터넷티비현금많이주는곳
안양학교폭력변호사
수원이혼전문변호사
구미이혼전문변호사
의정부형사변호사
수원형사변호사
웹사이트 상위노출
수원불법촬영변호사
안양법무법인
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#폰테크
의정부형사전문변호사
대전탐정사무소
흥신소
의정부변호사
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저신용장기렌트
안양이혼전문변호사
이혼전문변호사추천
폰테크 사이트
의정부음주운전변호사
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수원법률사무소
이혼전문변호사
의정부이혼변호사
폰테크당일
인터넷티비현금많이주는곳
고양이혼전문변호사
위자료
상간녀소송
수원탐정사무소
용인이혼변호사
당일폰테크
무심사장기렌트카
이혼소송
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인스타 팔로워 늘리기
수원성범죄변호사
용인학교폭력변호사
문해력강의
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인스타그램 좋아요
안양학교폭력변호사
의정부성범죄변호사
사이트 상위노출
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상간소송변호사
말기암요양병원
수원법무법인
수원변호사
항암요양병원
검사출신마약전문변호사
평택이혼전문변호사
성남성범죄변호사
폰테크
인스타그램 좋아요
의정부이혼전문변호사
용인이혼변호사
의정부변호사
저신용장기렌트카
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