용인차장검사출신변호사 EU-남미 FTA, 유럽의회서 제동···“비준 2년 지연될 수도”
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용인차장검사출신변호사 유럽연합(EU)과 남미공동시장(메르코수르)이 맺은 자유무역협정(FTA)이 21일(현지시간) 유럽의회에서 보류됐다.
로이터 통신 등에 따르면 유럽의회는 이날 FTA를 유럽사법재판소(ECJ)에 회부해 EU조약에 부합하는지 판단받기로 의결했다. 법원 회부안은 찬성 334표, 반대 324표, 기권 11표로 가결됐다.
유럽의회는 법원 판단이 나올 때까지 협정안을 승인·비준할 수 없다. 법원 심리는 통상 18~24개월 소요되며, 이 기간 동안 FTA를 잠정 발효할지를 두고 EU 집행위원회와 유럽의회가 충돌할 전망이라고 폴리티코유럽판은 전했다.
프리드리히 메르츠 독일 총리는 이날 표결 결과에 대해 “지정학적 상황을 오판한 것”이라며 FTA 협정이 즉시 적용돼야 한다고 주장했다.
메르코수르는 아르헨티나·브라질·파라과이·우루과이 등을 정회원으로 둔 남미 경제 공동체다. 앞서 EU와 메르코수르는 25년 간의 협상 끝에 지난 17일 FTA에 서명했다.
하지만 프랑스·폴란드·헝가리 등 농업 비중이 큰 나라를 중심으로 자국 농민 보호를 이유로 한 반대 목소리가 이어지면서 유럽의회에서 협정 비준이 어려움을 겪을 수 있다는 전망이 나왔다. FTA 발효를 위해서는 유럽의회 비준이 필요하다.
이에 맞서 독일, 스페인 등은 도널드 트럼프 미국 대통령의 무역시장 교란에 대응하고 희토류 등 광물의 중국 의존도를 낮추기 위해 FTA가 필요하다고 주장해 왔다.
독일 출신인 베른트 랑게 유럽의회 무역위원장은 “법적 검토를 핑계로 지연 전술을 쓰지 말고 동의 절차에서 반대표를 던져야 한다”며 “완전히 무책임한 자책골”이라고 비판했다.
유럽과 달리 남미의 경우 FTA가 광범위한 지지를 받고 있어 비준 가능성이 높다고 AP 통신은 전했다.
The past year, since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House, has been a relentless succession of the unpredictable. He weaponized tariffs, turning them against allies as readily as adversaries. He invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to Alaska and greeted him like an old friend, and—defying his reputation as an “isolationist”—ordered airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Trump has given no one time to even take stock of his first year back in office. At the very start of the new year, he has launched an attack on Venezuela and is openly stoking ambitions to seize Greenland by force if necessary.
Asked to choose words that best describe the Trump administration’s foreign policy over the past year, Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, responded in an email interview with the Kyunghyang Daily News on January 19: “Thuggish. Extortionate. Frenzied. Myopic.” Wertheim is also a co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy, which Foreign Affairs selected as its “Book of the Year”.
Wertheim said that President Trump is “offering an enthusiastically naked imperialism,” adding that “even U.S. allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying.”
KYUNGHYANG: The operation to capture Nicolas Maduro came as a shock in that it appeared to mark a return to an era in which “might makes right.” What do you believe the Trump administration’s attack on Venezuela signifies for the international order?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s attack on Venezuela is hardly the first time the United States has used military force aggressively and in violation of international law. What is different is that Trump makes little-to-no attempt even to claim he’s acting for a higher principle. He says his main motive for turning gunboats on Caracas is to “take the oil.” I believe him. He is currently threatening to strike multiple countries and annex the sovereign territory of other states, including NATO allies. He may well do that.
When they went to war, Trump’s predecessors not only claimed to be improving the international order; they also believed what they said — perhaps to a fault. But if traditional U.S. presidents sometimes allowed liberal ordering to turn into liberal imperialism, Trump is offering enthusiastically naked imperialism.
For the world, Trump’s conduct means that power politics has become an inescapable reality. Weak countries can count on Trump to boss them around. Even American allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying. The effect on U.S. adversaries, namely China and Russia, remains to be seen; they don’t need America’s permission to act as they like. At a minimum, however, Trump has helped Beijing to present itself as the responsible steward of international order and more easily justify its own coercion, present and future. He has further lowered the bar Moscow needs to clear to appear less bad, in the eyes of many across the Global South, than the United States and the West.
KYUNGHYANG: President Trump has also suggested the possibility of using military force against Greenland. Following the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities and the apparent success of the Venezuela operation, some argue that Trump may have developed a sense of confidence — or even efficacy — in the use of military force. How far do you think he may be willing to expand the use of force going forward?
WERTHEIM: Trump is emboldened. He has ordered a succession of attacks that might have caused immediate blowback but didn’t — so far. The trend began with his assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in the last year of his first term. Now, in his second term, he has bombed Iran, blown up alleged drug boats in the Caribbean basin, and launched airstrikes in Syria and Nigeria, all before the raid to capture Maduro. Trump still prefers to take one-and-done military actions and avoid the commitment of ground forces. But he probably thinks that the doubters kept warning of risks, and each time he proved them wrong, avoiding the quagmires that bedeviled other presidents. I fear that his luck will run out, and he may order more and more ambitious operations.
KYUNGHYANG: Trump’s announcement of plans to impose tariffs on eight European Union countries that oppose the U.S. annexation of Greenland has pushed the transatlantic alliance into what many see as its gravest crisis to date. What do you believe the future holds for the transatlantic alliance and NATO?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s quest to annex Greenland has the potential not only to fracture the transatlantic alliance but to divide Europe as well. If Trump keeps intensifying pressure on Denmark to sell the territory, the European countries who rely the most on U.S. military protection may urge Copenhagen to appease Trump, while other European countries may find that prospect unconscionable. So Europe could effectively split into two camps, with the United States siding with one against the other.
However the Greenland affair turns out, NATO will never be the same. Major European countries, including France and Germany, have learned they cannot remain dependent on the United States — not under Trump and not after Trump. Not only is American power unreliable, but it is liable to turn into a dagger aimed at your heart. I can imagine several possible futures for the transatlantic alliance, but the next decade won’t look like the last.
KYUNGHYANG: For years, Latin America was treated as a low-priority region in major U.S. strategic documents. Yet in the Trump administration’s latest National Security Strategy, the Western Hemisphere is designated as a top strategic priority. Why do you think the Trump administration, unlike previous administrations, is placing such emphasis on the Western Hemisphere?
WERTHEIM: Consider three levels: Trump, his administration, and the world.
Trump has all along felt that the most grievous threats to the United States traverse the nation’s borders. Immigrants, gangs, drugs, and even, less directly, trade — Trump securitizes these issues and prioritizes them above conventional military threats far away. That worldview has put Trump on a collision course with America’s hemispheric neighbors.
Yet it’s only in his second presidency that the Western Hemisphere has ascended to the top of U.S. strategic priorities. That’s because Trump has finally surrounded himself with likeminded or obedient advisers willing to implement his vision. In part because his vision is capacious, his administration contains several factions who compete over most areas of foreign policy. On the Western Hemisphere, however, the factions overlap. “Primacists” such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio can agree with “restrainers,” who favor U.S. military pullbacks overseas, that the United States should show greater concern with challenges close to home.
And now that the United States has lost a position of dominance in Europe and Asia, the Western Hemisphere has reemerged as a fresh-seeming terrain in which to wield American power. Trump prefers to deal with the weak, and Trump isn’t alone: the United States has sought to achieve uncontested global supremacy ever since the Cold War ended. Today Washington can no longer enjoy the same position worldwide, but it can dominate what the Trump administration calls “our hemisphere.”
KYUNGHYANG: Trump and the MAGA movement have long been described as isolationist. Yet Trump has intervened extensively abroad, calling into question whether that label remains analytically useful. He once appeared to approach the use of power like a businessman weighing costs and returns, but he now seems increasingly willing to assert power for its own sake. How would you characterize the underlying logic or strategy of Trump’s foreign policy?
WERTHEIM: Trump has never been an isolationist; he wants to take things from the world, not withdraw from it. Nor does Trump make careful calculations of costs and benefits. He has always been a showman more than a businessman, and as president, he is guided above all by the performance of power. He wants to tell Americans, the world, and perhaps himself that he is in control and getting his way. More specifically, he is performing his vision of “peace through strength,” which involves both ending armed conflicts and using military force in targeted ways to display American might.
The irony is that Trump is supposed to put “America first” in all things, yet he lacks a coherent account of what American interests are. At least the original so-called isolationists of 1940 and 1941 had an identifiable understanding of U.S. interests: they contended that so long as the United States kept outside powers out of the Western Hemisphere, North America would remain secure from attack. They were not necessarily wrong on that point, even though their prescription might have been terrible for the world. Trump, by contrast, chafes at the global commitments he has inherited but has yet to relinquish any of them.
KYUNGHYANG: The new National Security Strategy(NSS) does not contain systemic criticism of China or Russia. Some analysts note that this is the first NSS since 1988 that does not reference China’s authoritarianism even once. What do you think this shift signifies?
WERTHEIM: The National Security Strategy makes almost no distinction between democratic and authoritarian states. Under Trump’s predecessors, however, the United States has opposed Russia and China not only because they were authoritarian, but also, and mainly, because they threaten American primacy, including U.S. allies.
The new National Security Strategy does not take the accommodating view of China that some analysts have suggested. True, it avoids adversarial verbiage toward China. Yet it offers Beijing no concessions — nothing but the chance to accept coexistence on Washington’s terms. In particular, the document states that Taiwan is strategically and economically important to the United States and promises to “build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.” While it seems Trump wants to avoid needlessly antagonizing Beijing through rhetoric, U.S.-China competition is continuing.
KYUNGHYANG: But some experts argue that the era of hegemonic competition is coming to an end, and that the United States, China, and Russia may be moving toward a great-power arrangement that tacitly recognizes spheres of influence. Do you agree with this interpretation?
WERTHEIM: I essentially disagree. Trump has reclaimed America’s traditional sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, but that does not mean he’s willing to grant China or Russia spheres in their own regions. The normal hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy is: “spheres of influence for me, but not for thee.” If that hypocrisy hasn’t bothered other presidents, it certainly won’t bother Trump.
Trump has not offered to cede a sphere of influence to Beijing or Moscow in their regions. He hardly welcomed the expansion of Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific. Trump has, of course, supported Russia’s demand to retain the territory it currently occupies in Ukraine, plus the rest of the Donetsk region, but in that case Trump seems to be attempting to reach a pragmatic end to the war rather than grant Russia a wider sphere of influence in eastern Europe or Central Asia.
In short, Trump is asserting American power globally, not pulling the United States back to its own hemisphere. That said, Trump may yet make some sort of deal over Taiwan or diminish U.S. defense responsibilities in Europe. He may also weaken the foundations that generate American power over the long term, including the country’s international attractiveness and state capacity. In a decades’ time, the United States may well have a more modest global military presence and fewer defense commitments. But even if that happens, the United States will remain a major security player in Asia and the Western Hemisphere at a minimum, and I doubt that Russia could rampage through much of eastern Europe.
KYUNGHYANG: North Korea is not mentioned even once in the new NSS. This has led to speculation in South Korea that the United States may have effectively accepted the practical impossibility of North Korean denuclearization and downgraded the priority of the nuclear issue. What is your assessment?
WERTHEIM: As Barack Obama left office a decade ago, he told Trump that North Korea was the most pressing threat the new president would face. Since Trump failed to make a nuclear deal with Kim Jong-un in 2019, North Korea has dropped far down Washington’s list of foreign policy priorities. The new National Security Strategy reflects that reality.
In my view, the United States has all but accepted the practical impossibility of fully denuclearizing North Korea, even though it hasn’t officially said so. There is no realistic scenario in which North Korea will decide to relinquish its nuclear arsenal.
The Biden administration effectively sought to strengthen deterrence and manage risk, not to advance toward denuclearization. Trump personally seems to want to return to the negotiating table with Kim Jong-un as part of his attempt to be the “president of peace.” But there are no signs of what Trump would be willing to offer Kim, and Kim’s asking price, if there is one, has gone up due to his partnership with Russia and distrust of the United States.
KYUNGHYANG: The new NSS emphasizes that the United States will no longer bear security burdens unilaterally, calling on allies to share responsibility. It specifically highlights the roles of South Korea and Japan in the Indo-Pacific, including the defense of the First Island Chain. In the event of a contingency involving Taiwan, what strategic role does the United States expect South Korea to play?
WERTHEIM: I don’t think many people in the U.S. government expect South Korea to join a U.S.-led coalition to fight China. (Nor is it knowable whether the United States would fight China; “strategic ambiguity” isn’t just a policy but a real reflection of U.S. intention, or lack thereof.) Instead, South Korea would be expected to provide logistical support for allied forces and produce defense equipment to sustain the war effort. Most importantly, South Korea would need to assume the full burden of deterring North Korea even as some U.S. forces and assets on the Korean peninsula get diverted to the Taiwan theater.
KYUNGHYANG: I would like to ask about the Trump administration’s response to the recent tensions between China and Japan. While Prime Minister Takaichi’s comments about possible involvement in a Taiwan contingency may have been diplomatically awkward, they were broadly aligned with U.S. expectations regarding Japan’s security role. However, the Trump administration’s expressions of support for Japan were both muted in tone and notably delayed, giving the impression that Washington preferred to stand on the sidelines of this dispute.
WERTHEIM: The U.S. ambassador to Japan did express support for Japan and Takaichi, but Trump himself was muted. Trump’s response reflects his desire for stable relations with Beijing after the two countries had reached a fragile trade truce. In addition, Trump prefers to remain strictly ambiguous about how the United States itself would respond to a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. In the context of Taiwan as well as Ukraine, he seems to think it’s unwise for a weaker country to use inflammatory language that could provoke a stronger country. So it wouldn’t surprise me if Trump personally disapproved of Takaichi’s comments, which appeared to suggest that Japan would use military force if China used armed force to attack Taiwan.
Still, I don’t see a real change in U.S. policy so far. We’ll find out in the coming months if Trump and Xi are interested in reaching a new understanding about Taiwan.
로이터 통신 등에 따르면 유럽의회는 이날 FTA를 유럽사법재판소(ECJ)에 회부해 EU조약에 부합하는지 판단받기로 의결했다. 법원 회부안은 찬성 334표, 반대 324표, 기권 11표로 가결됐다.
유럽의회는 법원 판단이 나올 때까지 협정안을 승인·비준할 수 없다. 법원 심리는 통상 18~24개월 소요되며, 이 기간 동안 FTA를 잠정 발효할지를 두고 EU 집행위원회와 유럽의회가 충돌할 전망이라고 폴리티코유럽판은 전했다.
프리드리히 메르츠 독일 총리는 이날 표결 결과에 대해 “지정학적 상황을 오판한 것”이라며 FTA 협정이 즉시 적용돼야 한다고 주장했다.
메르코수르는 아르헨티나·브라질·파라과이·우루과이 등을 정회원으로 둔 남미 경제 공동체다. 앞서 EU와 메르코수르는 25년 간의 협상 끝에 지난 17일 FTA에 서명했다.
하지만 프랑스·폴란드·헝가리 등 농업 비중이 큰 나라를 중심으로 자국 농민 보호를 이유로 한 반대 목소리가 이어지면서 유럽의회에서 협정 비준이 어려움을 겪을 수 있다는 전망이 나왔다. FTA 발효를 위해서는 유럽의회 비준이 필요하다.
이에 맞서 독일, 스페인 등은 도널드 트럼프 미국 대통령의 무역시장 교란에 대응하고 희토류 등 광물의 중국 의존도를 낮추기 위해 FTA가 필요하다고 주장해 왔다.
독일 출신인 베른트 랑게 유럽의회 무역위원장은 “법적 검토를 핑계로 지연 전술을 쓰지 말고 동의 절차에서 반대표를 던져야 한다”며 “완전히 무책임한 자책골”이라고 비판했다.
유럽과 달리 남미의 경우 FTA가 광범위한 지지를 받고 있어 비준 가능성이 높다고 AP 통신은 전했다.
The past year, since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House, has been a relentless succession of the unpredictable. He weaponized tariffs, turning them against allies as readily as adversaries. He invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to Alaska and greeted him like an old friend, and—defying his reputation as an “isolationist”—ordered airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Trump has given no one time to even take stock of his first year back in office. At the very start of the new year, he has launched an attack on Venezuela and is openly stoking ambitions to seize Greenland by force if necessary.
Asked to choose words that best describe the Trump administration’s foreign policy over the past year, Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, responded in an email interview with the Kyunghyang Daily News on January 19: “Thuggish. Extortionate. Frenzied. Myopic.” Wertheim is also a co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and the author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy, which Foreign Affairs selected as its “Book of the Year”.
Wertheim said that President Trump is “offering an enthusiastically naked imperialism,” adding that “even U.S. allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying.”
KYUNGHYANG: The operation to capture Nicolas Maduro came as a shock in that it appeared to mark a return to an era in which “might makes right.” What do you believe the Trump administration’s attack on Venezuela signifies for the international order?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s attack on Venezuela is hardly the first time the United States has used military force aggressively and in violation of international law. What is different is that Trump makes little-to-no attempt even to claim he’s acting for a higher principle. He says his main motive for turning gunboats on Caracas is to “take the oil.” I believe him. He is currently threatening to strike multiple countries and annex the sovereign territory of other states, including NATO allies. He may well do that.
When they went to war, Trump’s predecessors not only claimed to be improving the international order; they also believed what they said — perhaps to a fault. But if traditional U.S. presidents sometimes allowed liberal ordering to turn into liberal imperialism, Trump is offering enthusiastically naked imperialism.
For the world, Trump’s conduct means that power politics has become an inescapable reality. Weak countries can count on Trump to boss them around. Even American allies must now prepare to stand up to Washington’s bullying. The effect on U.S. adversaries, namely China and Russia, remains to be seen; they don’t need America’s permission to act as they like. At a minimum, however, Trump has helped Beijing to present itself as the responsible steward of international order and more easily justify its own coercion, present and future. He has further lowered the bar Moscow needs to clear to appear less bad, in the eyes of many across the Global South, than the United States and the West.
KYUNGHYANG: President Trump has also suggested the possibility of using military force against Greenland. Following the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities and the apparent success of the Venezuela operation, some argue that Trump may have developed a sense of confidence — or even efficacy — in the use of military force. How far do you think he may be willing to expand the use of force going forward?
WERTHEIM: Trump is emboldened. He has ordered a succession of attacks that might have caused immediate blowback but didn’t — so far. The trend began with his assassination of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in the last year of his first term. Now, in his second term, he has bombed Iran, blown up alleged drug boats in the Caribbean basin, and launched airstrikes in Syria and Nigeria, all before the raid to capture Maduro. Trump still prefers to take one-and-done military actions and avoid the commitment of ground forces. But he probably thinks that the doubters kept warning of risks, and each time he proved them wrong, avoiding the quagmires that bedeviled other presidents. I fear that his luck will run out, and he may order more and more ambitious operations.
KYUNGHYANG: Trump’s announcement of plans to impose tariffs on eight European Union countries that oppose the U.S. annexation of Greenland has pushed the transatlantic alliance into what many see as its gravest crisis to date. What do you believe the future holds for the transatlantic alliance and NATO?
WERTHEIM: Trump’s quest to annex Greenland has the potential not only to fracture the transatlantic alliance but to divide Europe as well. If Trump keeps intensifying pressure on Denmark to sell the territory, the European countries who rely the most on U.S. military protection may urge Copenhagen to appease Trump, while other European countries may find that prospect unconscionable. So Europe could effectively split into two camps, with the United States siding with one against the other.
However the Greenland affair turns out, NATO will never be the same. Major European countries, including France and Germany, have learned they cannot remain dependent on the United States — not under Trump and not after Trump. Not only is American power unreliable, but it is liable to turn into a dagger aimed at your heart. I can imagine several possible futures for the transatlantic alliance, but the next decade won’t look like the last.
KYUNGHYANG: For years, Latin America was treated as a low-priority region in major U.S. strategic documents. Yet in the Trump administration’s latest National Security Strategy, the Western Hemisphere is designated as a top strategic priority. Why do you think the Trump administration, unlike previous administrations, is placing such emphasis on the Western Hemisphere?
WERTHEIM: Consider three levels: Trump, his administration, and the world.
Trump has all along felt that the most grievous threats to the United States traverse the nation’s borders. Immigrants, gangs, drugs, and even, less directly, trade — Trump securitizes these issues and prioritizes them above conventional military threats far away. That worldview has put Trump on a collision course with America’s hemispheric neighbors.
Yet it’s only in his second presidency that the Western Hemisphere has ascended to the top of U.S. strategic priorities. That’s because Trump has finally surrounded himself with likeminded or obedient advisers willing to implement his vision. In part because his vision is capacious, his administration contains several factions who compete over most areas of foreign policy. On the Western Hemisphere, however, the factions overlap. “Primacists” such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio can agree with “restrainers,” who favor U.S. military pullbacks overseas, that the United States should show greater concern with challenges close to home.
And now that the United States has lost a position of dominance in Europe and Asia, the Western Hemisphere has reemerged as a fresh-seeming terrain in which to wield American power. Trump prefers to deal with the weak, and Trump isn’t alone: the United States has sought to achieve uncontested global supremacy ever since the Cold War ended. Today Washington can no longer enjoy the same position worldwide, but it can dominate what the Trump administration calls “our hemisphere.”
KYUNGHYANG: Trump and the MAGA movement have long been described as isolationist. Yet Trump has intervened extensively abroad, calling into question whether that label remains analytically useful. He once appeared to approach the use of power like a businessman weighing costs and returns, but he now seems increasingly willing to assert power for its own sake. How would you characterize the underlying logic or strategy of Trump’s foreign policy?
WERTHEIM: Trump has never been an isolationist; he wants to take things from the world, not withdraw from it. Nor does Trump make careful calculations of costs and benefits. He has always been a showman more than a businessman, and as president, he is guided above all by the performance of power. He wants to tell Americans, the world, and perhaps himself that he is in control and getting his way. More specifically, he is performing his vision of “peace through strength,” which involves both ending armed conflicts and using military force in targeted ways to display American might.
The irony is that Trump is supposed to put “America first” in all things, yet he lacks a coherent account of what American interests are. At least the original so-called isolationists of 1940 and 1941 had an identifiable understanding of U.S. interests: they contended that so long as the United States kept outside powers out of the Western Hemisphere, North America would remain secure from attack. They were not necessarily wrong on that point, even though their prescription might have been terrible for the world. Trump, by contrast, chafes at the global commitments he has inherited but has yet to relinquish any of them.
KYUNGHYANG: The new National Security Strategy(NSS) does not contain systemic criticism of China or Russia. Some analysts note that this is the first NSS since 1988 that does not reference China’s authoritarianism even once. What do you think this shift signifies?
WERTHEIM: The National Security Strategy makes almost no distinction between democratic and authoritarian states. Under Trump’s predecessors, however, the United States has opposed Russia and China not only because they were authoritarian, but also, and mainly, because they threaten American primacy, including U.S. allies.
The new National Security Strategy does not take the accommodating view of China that some analysts have suggested. True, it avoids adversarial verbiage toward China. Yet it offers Beijing no concessions — nothing but the chance to accept coexistence on Washington’s terms. In particular, the document states that Taiwan is strategically and economically important to the United States and promises to “build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.” While it seems Trump wants to avoid needlessly antagonizing Beijing through rhetoric, U.S.-China competition is continuing.
KYUNGHYANG: But some experts argue that the era of hegemonic competition is coming to an end, and that the United States, China, and Russia may be moving toward a great-power arrangement that tacitly recognizes spheres of influence. Do you agree with this interpretation?
WERTHEIM: I essentially disagree. Trump has reclaimed America’s traditional sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, but that does not mean he’s willing to grant China or Russia spheres in their own regions. The normal hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy is: “spheres of influence for me, but not for thee.” If that hypocrisy hasn’t bothered other presidents, it certainly won’t bother Trump.
Trump has not offered to cede a sphere of influence to Beijing or Moscow in their regions. He hardly welcomed the expansion of Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific. Trump has, of course, supported Russia’s demand to retain the territory it currently occupies in Ukraine, plus the rest of the Donetsk region, but in that case Trump seems to be attempting to reach a pragmatic end to the war rather than grant Russia a wider sphere of influence in eastern Europe or Central Asia.
In short, Trump is asserting American power globally, not pulling the United States back to its own hemisphere. That said, Trump may yet make some sort of deal over Taiwan or diminish U.S. defense responsibilities in Europe. He may also weaken the foundations that generate American power over the long term, including the country’s international attractiveness and state capacity. In a decades’ time, the United States may well have a more modest global military presence and fewer defense commitments. But even if that happens, the United States will remain a major security player in Asia and the Western Hemisphere at a minimum, and I doubt that Russia could rampage through much of eastern Europe.
KYUNGHYANG: North Korea is not mentioned even once in the new NSS. This has led to speculation in South Korea that the United States may have effectively accepted the practical impossibility of North Korean denuclearization and downgraded the priority of the nuclear issue. What is your assessment?
WERTHEIM: As Barack Obama left office a decade ago, he told Trump that North Korea was the most pressing threat the new president would face. Since Trump failed to make a nuclear deal with Kim Jong-un in 2019, North Korea has dropped far down Washington’s list of foreign policy priorities. The new National Security Strategy reflects that reality.
In my view, the United States has all but accepted the practical impossibility of fully denuclearizing North Korea, even though it hasn’t officially said so. There is no realistic scenario in which North Korea will decide to relinquish its nuclear arsenal.
The Biden administration effectively sought to strengthen deterrence and manage risk, not to advance toward denuclearization. Trump personally seems to want to return to the negotiating table with Kim Jong-un as part of his attempt to be the “president of peace.” But there are no signs of what Trump would be willing to offer Kim, and Kim’s asking price, if there is one, has gone up due to his partnership with Russia and distrust of the United States.
KYUNGHYANG: The new NSS emphasizes that the United States will no longer bear security burdens unilaterally, calling on allies to share responsibility. It specifically highlights the roles of South Korea and Japan in the Indo-Pacific, including the defense of the First Island Chain. In the event of a contingency involving Taiwan, what strategic role does the United States expect South Korea to play?
WERTHEIM: I don’t think many people in the U.S. government expect South Korea to join a U.S.-led coalition to fight China. (Nor is it knowable whether the United States would fight China; “strategic ambiguity” isn’t just a policy but a real reflection of U.S. intention, or lack thereof.) Instead, South Korea would be expected to provide logistical support for allied forces and produce defense equipment to sustain the war effort. Most importantly, South Korea would need to assume the full burden of deterring North Korea even as some U.S. forces and assets on the Korean peninsula get diverted to the Taiwan theater.
KYUNGHYANG: I would like to ask about the Trump administration’s response to the recent tensions between China and Japan. While Prime Minister Takaichi’s comments about possible involvement in a Taiwan contingency may have been diplomatically awkward, they were broadly aligned with U.S. expectations regarding Japan’s security role. However, the Trump administration’s expressions of support for Japan were both muted in tone and notably delayed, giving the impression that Washington preferred to stand on the sidelines of this dispute.
WERTHEIM: The U.S. ambassador to Japan did express support for Japan and Takaichi, but Trump himself was muted. Trump’s response reflects his desire for stable relations with Beijing after the two countries had reached a fragile trade truce. In addition, Trump prefers to remain strictly ambiguous about how the United States itself would respond to a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. In the context of Taiwan as well as Ukraine, he seems to think it’s unwise for a weaker country to use inflammatory language that could provoke a stronger country. So it wouldn’t surprise me if Trump personally disapproved of Takaichi’s comments, which appeared to suggest that Japan would use military force if China used armed force to attack Taiwan.
Still, I don’t see a real change in U.S. policy so far. We’ll find out in the coming months if Trump and Xi are interested in reaching a new understanding about Taiwan.
남양주대형로펌, 의정부성범죄변호사, 인스타 팔로워, 분당성추행변호사, 대전이혼전문변호사, 수원성추행변호사, 이지렌터카, 안산이혼변호사, 성남성범죄전문변호사, 암요양병원, 의정부대형로펌, 이혼전문변호사, 의정부이혼변호사, 인터넷가입현금지원, 천안이혼전문변호사, 경주이혼전문변호사, 용인성범죄전문변호사, 용인성범죄전문변호사, 인터넷비교사이트, 승소사례, 의정부형사전문변호사, 저신용장기렌트, 출장용접알곤, 웹사이트 상위노출, 팔팔정구입, 분당성추행변호사, 안양이혼전문변호사, 수원강간변호사, 용인음주운전변호사, 상간녀소송, 수원대형로펌, 위자료, 인터넷설치현금, 폰테크, 의정부학교폭력변호사, 무심사장기렌트카, 안양음주운전변호사, 이지렌트카, 수원상간소송변호사, 인터넷가입현금지원, 상간남소송, 수원상간소송변호사, 용인이혼변호사, 분당불법촬영변호사, 용인성범죄변호사, 분당불법촬영변호사, 대구이혼전문변호사, 수원형사변호사, 이혼전문변호사, 의정부이혼전문변호사, 성남성범죄전문변호사, 부장검사출신변호사, 웹사이트 상위노출, 수원성범죄변호사, 수원음주운전변호사, 용인강간변호사, 수원이혼전문변호사, 분당성추행변호사, 의정부성범죄전문변호사, 경주이혼전문변호사, 안산이혼전문변호사, 안양이혼변호사, 의정부음주운전변호사, 폰테크, 남성진변호사, 용인이혼변호사, 용인불법촬영변호사, 인천폰테크, 평택이혼전문변호사, 위자료, 비아그라 약국, 폰테크, 용인음주운전변호사, 인터넷가입사은품많이주는곳, 의정부법률사무소, 의정부성범죄전문변호사, 안양이혼전문변호사, 서울이혼전문변호사, 수원불법촬영변호사, 폰테크, 용인성추행변호사, 미스트롯4투표, 인터넷가입, 수원불법촬영변호사, 수원음주운전변호사, 약, 수원형사전문변호사, 코글플래닛, 콘텐츠이용료상품권, 안산학교폭력변호사, 인터넷설치현금, 수원성추행변호사, 성남성범죄변호사, 저신용장기렌트, 폰테크, 수원법률사무소, 의정부변호사, 성남대형로펌, 신불자장기렌트, 안양상간소송변호사, 비아그라 후기, 의정부형사전문변호사, 인터넷티비현금많이주는곳, 연체자장기렌트, 수원차장검사출신변호사, 의정부성범죄전문변호사, 의정부촉법소년변호사, 용인강간변호사, 김해이혼전문변호사, 수원학교폭력변호사, 수원법무법인, 안양이혼전문변호사, 수원이혼변호사, 용인성범죄변호사, 수원이혼전문변호사, 네이버검색광고, 안양이혼변호사, 차장검사출신변호사, 의정부이혼전문변호사, 용인형사변호사, 수원폰테크, 서울탐정사무소, 남양주법무법인, 수원형사변호사, 저신용장기렌트카, 상간녀변호사, 용인성범죄변호사, 의정부이혼변호사, 의정부법무법인, 용인이혼변호사, 인터넷가입사은품많이주는곳, 폰테크, 수원강제추행변호사, 수원상간소송변호사, 안양상간소송변호사, 의정부변호사, 탐정사무소, 서울탐정사무소, 신용회복중장기렌트, 의정부변호사, 수원형사전문변호사, 의정부형사변호사, 용인대형로펌, 폰테크, 마사지구인, 용인차장검사출신변호사, 안양학교폭력변호사, 수원성범죄전문변호사, 유방암요양, 수원음주운전변호사, 인터넷가입, 협의이혼, 웹사이트 상위노출, 수원불법촬영변호사, 흥신소, 안산이혼전문변호사, 수원소년보호사건변호사, 의정부형사전문변호사, 수원불법촬영변호사, 위례요양병원, 안양음주운전변호사, 약, 이지렌터카, 의정부법무법인, 이혼상담, 폰테크., 폰테크, 수원성범죄변호사, 수원대형로펌, 분당강제추행변호사, 인터넷가입현금지원, 의정부음주운전변호사, 수원변호사, 이혼전문변호사, 청주이혼전문변호사, 의정부이혼변호사, 폰테크, 비아그라 부작용, 용인이혼전문변호사, 수원형사변호사, 항암, 남양주학교폭력변호사, 인터넷가입사은품많이주는곳, 무심사무보증장기렌트, 수원성추행변호사, 의정부이혼변호사, 무신용장기렌트, 안산학교폭력변호사, 용인상간소송변호사, 수원형사변호사, 안양대형로펌, 분당성추행변호사, 폰테크, 성범죄전문변호사, 안산음주운전변호사, 인터넷설치현금, 용인이혼전문변호사, 수원형사전문변호사, 용인성추행변호사, 빠른이혼, 수원이혼전문변호사, 저신용무보증장기렌트카, 수원성범죄전문변호사, 수원강간변호사, 구미이혼전문변호사, 용인학교폭력변호사, 수원강간변호사, 안양대형로펌, 수원상간소송변호사, 상간녀소송, 평택학교폭력변호사, 이혼상담, 의정부상간녀변호사, 인천흥신소, 이혼상담, 한게임클래식, 수원성추행변호사, 의정부성범죄전문변호사, 폰테크, 의정부성범죄전문변호사, 양산이혼전문변호사, 알곤출장용접, 수원형사변호사, 수원강제추행변호사, 출장용접, 용인음주운전변호사, 용인성범죄전문변호사, 수원촉법소년변호사, 의정부이혼변호사, 양산이혼전문변호사, 폰테크, 안산상간소송변호사, 수원성범죄변호사, 상조내구제, 비아그라 지속시간, 의정부이혼전문변호사, 수원검사출신변호사, 용인법무법인, 이지렌터카, 이지렌트, 성남음주운전변호사, 웹사이트 상위노출, 수원상간소송변호사, 인터넷가입현금지원, 인스타 좋아요 구매, 비아그라 효능, 안산상간소송변호사, 폰테크, 마사지구직, 의정부형사전문변호사, 폰테크, 웹사이트 상위노출, 분당강제추행변호사, 인스타 좋아요 구매, 대전흥신소, 인터넷가입, 내구제, 폰테크, 수원형사변호사, 폰테크, 용인성추행변호사, 의정부이혼변호사, 수원성추행변호사, 구미이혼전문변호사, 수원형사변호사, 남양주학교폭력변호사, 비아그라 종류, 수원이혼전문변호사, 수원마약전문변호사, 용인이혼전문변호사, 부천이혼전문변호사, 용인강간변호사, 출장용접, 웹사이트, 인터넷설치현금, 비타민c세럼, 출장용접, 탐정사무소, 이혼상담, 사이트 상위노출, 인터넷설치현금, 의정부상간소송변호사, 수원소년사건변호사, 양주학교폭력변호사, 경주이혼전문변호사, 수원강간변호사, 수원법률사무소, 저신용장기렌트카, 용인성범죄변호사, 수원학교폭력변호사, 당일폰테크, 당일 폰테크, 수원이혼전문변호사, 당일폰테크, 의정부형사변호사, 수원음주운전변호사, 의정부법무법인, 신불자장기렌트, 당일폰테크, 수원강간변호사, 안산음주운전변호사, 창원이혼전문변호사, 의정부형사변호사, 유방암요양병원, 신용불량장기렌트, 개인회생장기렌트, 수원성범죄변호사, 김해이혼전문변호사, 홈페이지 상위노출, 문해력, 이혼변호사, 인터넷티비현금많이주는곳, 비아그라 효과, 의정부이혼변호사, 용인강간변호사, 수원법률사무소, 수원형사전문변호사, 폰테크, 피망머니상, 분당성추행변호사, 용인성추행변호사, 안양상간소송변호사, 평택이혼전문변호사, 의정부상간소송변호사, 용인법무법인, 성남성범죄전문변호사, 수원변호사, 수원성범죄전문변호사, 인터넷설치현금, 조정이혼, 저신용렌탈, 상조내구제, 경주이혼전문변호사, 수원성범죄변호사, 대구이혼전문변호사, 이혼소송, 평택학교폭력변호사, 폰테크당일, 양육권, 포항이혼전문변호사, 인터넷티비현금많이주는곳, 무심사장기렌트카, 청주이혼전문변호사, 의정부음주운전변호사, 의정부형사전문변호사, 성남법무법인, 검사출신변호사, 폰테크 사이트, 성남대형로펌, 수원상간소송변호사, 비아그라 복용법, 의정부형사전문변호사, 네이버 웹사이트 상위노출, 평택이혼전문변호사, 수원대형로펌, 의정부음주운전변호사, 코글플래닛, 수원소년범죄변호사, 용인성추행변호사, 수원성범죄변호사, 웹사이트 상위노출, 인터넷가입사은품많이주는곳, 자동차장기리스, 한게임머니상, 분당성추행변호사, 폰테크당일, 구미이혼전문변호사, 인터넷설치현금, 수원이혼변호사, 인터넷가입, 의정부성범죄전문변호사, 분당강제추행변호사, 한게임클래식, 폰테크 당일, 성남이혼변호사, 비아그라 처방, 폰테크 당일, 평택이혼전문변호사, 의정부변호사, 의정부이혼전문변호사, 개인회생렌트카, 인터넷설치현금, 창원이혼전문변호사, 용인법무법인, 기업판촉물, 사이트 상위노출, 경주이혼전문변호사, 수원이혼전문변호사, 성남학교폭력변호사, 안양상간소송변호사, 비아그라 후기, 성남상간소송변호사, 용인성범죄전문변호사, 창원이혼전문변호사, 인터넷가입, 수원검사출신변호사, 인천흥신소, 수원성범죄변호사, 소규모해썹, 인터넷가입사은품많이주는곳, 수원이혼전문변호사, 유튜브 조회수 구매, 이혼소송, 차장검사출신변호사, 본그린, 수원성추행변호사, 수원음주운전변호사, 수원성범죄변호사, 폰테크 사이트, 성남성범죄전문변호사, 인스타그램 좋아요 구매, 말기암, 안양상간소송변호사, 수원상간소송변호사, 웹사이트 상위노출, 용인소년보호사건변호사, 의정부성범죄변호사, 오산개인회생, 폰테크, 성남학교폭력변호사, 수원검사출신변호사, 의정부이혼변호사, 안산이혼전문변호사, 수원불법촬영변호사, 성남상간소송변호사, 차장검사출신변호사, 세종이혼전문변호사, 인스
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